Downsizing and outsourcing shrink the corporation, seriously hampering career opportunities, and many well-educated managers turn to launch small businesses which function as outsourcees of the larger companies. The restructuring of the American business landscape, then, has bred a new race of outsourcees, usually small and medium sized firms which cater to the particular needs and operating fashion of large corporations, particularly in service businesses like consulting and finance (Kotter, 1995) .
GLOBALIZATION AND OUTSOURCING IN ARGENTINA
An economy goes global when it rapidly increases the density of cross-border organizational linkages. In other terms, globalization means the accelerated increase in commercial, financial and informational flows with other economies, embodied in tangible components like trade, investment and exchange of managers, and intangibles like the infusion of new business practices and know-how into the host-country partners 2 .
Considered one of the ten big emerging markets (BEMs) of the world 3 , Argentina is an interesting example of a rapidly globalizing economy. A full model of its micro-level transformation within the [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] period is depicted in Fig.1 . Stage 1 shows that substantial macroeconomic change (basically an unusually low inflation rate and strong incentives to foreign capital entry) induced a rapid increase in foreign direct investment (FDI, Stage 2) . FDI grew at an annual compounded rate of 314% within the 1991-1997 period, reaching a sizable cumulative amount of $ 36.7 billions, in the form of acquisitions (56% of all transactions), far followed by joint-ventures (9%), greenfield ventures (8%), and strategic alliances (3%), while mergers were very few (0,4%). Internal expansion, on the other hand, absorbed the remaining 23% of all transactions (Pereiro, 1998) .
FIGURE 1
A Model of Corporate Change in Emerging Economies: The Argentine Case Source: Pereiro (1998) This FDI inflow provoked severe dislocations in the business doing. As shown in Stage 3 of Fig.1 , the acquired companies were turned around, fastly improving productivity. This fueled the restructuring of already established large companies, both national and multinational, which had to mirror the efficiency gains of incoming competitors in order to survive (Stage 4) . Two popular transformation tactics were used, being very much the same as those applied in the U.S. restructuring process, namely downsizing and outsourcing (D/O). At the economy level, downsizing routines resulted in tremendous productivity gains; these have been estimated at 7% per year since 1991 (see Table 1 ). The use of tactical and strategic outsourcing increased fastly in both conglomerates and singlebusiness, large and small companies alike. A 1996 survey sampling 625 companies from a wide array of sectors and sizes showed that 46% of them were outsourcing; the figure climbed to 52% when only larger companies were considered (see Table 3 ). Another 1997 survey confirmed such results: 53% of surveyed companies were involved in outsourcing; only 16% of them were neither doing nor willing to subcontract (see Table 3 ). (Quinn, Doorley & Paquette, 1990) , the traditional, linear organizational hierarchy can be replaced by networks to which each actor contributes a unique core skill or capability (Evans & Wurster, 1997; Hamel & Prahalad, 1990; Quinn, 1992) . These fuzzy, ever-changing, loosely-structured networks have been called value-adding partnerships (Johnston & Lawrence, 1988) , value constellations (Normann & Ramírez, 1994) or hyperarchies (Evans & Wurster, 1997) . Network thinking was very influential among the managerial community in Argentina, providing a world-class rationale, so to speak, for justifying fragmenting the corporation. As a result, 'hollowing out' the firm is no longer an attitude to be ashamed of; it is deemed as a power-leveraging rather than a power-leaking business strategy.
b. Availability of outsourcees. Specialized, skilled and reliable outsourcees, frequently IT-enabled, are critical to outsourcing. For instance, Techint, a large engineering company with an annual turnover of $ 750 millions, no longer insources the blueprinting and detailed engineering of large construction projects, but rather subcontracts them to smaller companies working with state-of-the-art CAD technology; these provide much cheaper, flexible and faster response than any wholly-owned structure. In addition to local partners, world-class outsourcees are also locally available; Ryder, the logistics operator, entered the country in 1996 hand in hand with the comeback of GMC, which outsources all their autoparts trade logistics with Brazil to
Ryder. In the IT/ telecom businesses, EDS disembarked in 1994, providing services to many large companies.
c. Availability of consulting companies to help in the reengineering process. Shrinking a company while keeping it operational is no easy endeavor. Survivors of a downsizing must overcome the loss and trauma associated with lay-off; they also have to be re-trained to be able to attain higher efficiency levels.
These two processes are at odds with each other, and usually call for expert external advice. Consultants provide not only specific tools for managing the uncertainty of massive change efforts but also help in sustaining the needed momentum. Most international blue-chip strategy consulting companies like McKinley, ADL, BCG and Bozo Allen settled in the country, providing advice to most large groups under restructuring.
As to the small and medium enterprises (Smells, Stage 5), traditional family Smells started collapsing in droves; at the same time, corporate outsourcing started breeding a new kind of small business ventures. Like in the U.S. case, and although clearly traumatic for large companies in transition, the D/O syndrome generated business opportunities not only for incoming, wold-class outsourcers but also for new local companies with alike entrepreneurial ethos and skills. In short, outsourcing fostered the emergence of small, highly-skilled, fast-reacting domestic outsourcers. Finally, globalization bred itself; Stage 6 shows that increased domestic competition pushed large companies to look after foreign markets, where they could now compete on an equal foothold with locals.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Notably absent from the literature on globalization and corporate change are the nature and characteristics of domestically-bred small service outsourcees. Quinn (1992) has restricted his attention to large multinational service providers operating in the U.S. arena but did not touch upon domesticallyinduced service ventures thriving in transitioning economies. This is a true gap since, as partners of necessity in many deverticalization strategies (and also as agents of further globalization, as I will later argue), domestic outsourcees merit closer attention.
The purpose of this research was to build and test theory on these 'advanced' domestic service ventures in emerging economies, using a three-stages, holistic, multiple-case research design (Yin, 1994) , which proceeded as follows:
First case study. A growth service venture in the information technology (IT) sector was studied in depth.
The selection of this first case was a convenience one, dictated by the ample access to the organization provided by a year-long consulting assignment, which involved quite frequent interviewing with the CEO, first line managers, middle managers and line workers; this was coupled with a thorough analysis of corporate financial and operational records. In fact, it was this ethnographic study which suggested we could be in the presence of a new organizational type, different from both large corporate providers and more traditional SMEs in the country; a type of new venture I dub 'advanced', since used specific, differential levers to gain and maintain leadership positions in its segment. Quinn's (1992) description could provide some clues as to infer characteristics of small outsourcees. A list of features was hence developed and, in the end, it worked as a specific case study protocol to look for replication through other cases.
Replication logic. Two more cases were next developed to gauge the stability of the features found so far and to add to the potency of the theoretical blueprint through literal replication (Yin, 1994) . Personal networking and a business literature search allowed for detecting two ventures which, as the first one studied, were growth outsourcees successfully thriving in the service sector. The second selected case, like the first one, belonged to a high growth, high-tech industry (telecommunications). Following Eisenhardt's (1989) call to choose as different a case as possible, the third venture was selected from a rather pedestrian, unglamorous industry: office supplies. All corporate owner-CEOs of the three ventures were interviewed in-depth by a two-people team of researchers sharing the original case protocol.
Cross-case conclusions were next sought. We did a process of cross-case iterative, analytic generalization and, as a result, some key characteristics were dropped from the original list. The remaining features were matched with each case in a table format, showing the degree to which each of them was present in the cases studied (see Table 4 ). Research quality criteria. Special attention was dispensed to ensuring construct, internal and external validity, and reliability as well. Construct validity was improved by using multiple sources of evidence in the first case and by having key informants review drafts of the case studies reports in all three cases. Both internal and external validity were addressed through pattern-matching (Yin, 1994) among cases, replication, and the challenging of an equally plausible rival theory (which said that ASV's features are industry-dependent and not universal). Reliability was taken care of by developing a simple but consistent case protocol.
In the next section, the three cases studied are briefly described. In the subsequent section, their key organizational features are discussed in depth. Finally, I derive some general conclusions and suggestions for further research.
ADVANCED SERVICE VENTURES: THREE CASE STUDIES ITS: A Star is Born
In June 1989, when his boss at Hewlett Packard Argentina (HPA) told him that the personal computer (PC) was never to be as important a business as mainframes, Tobías Schmukler knew his days in the corporation were counted. Help desk settings are also human intensive, highly-stressful, rather uninspired environments usually plagued by high operator turnover. Operators are usually part-time university students which, after gaining experience, wish to be transferred to more enriching posts; this causes organizational strain, since neither the provider nor the customer want to dispense with qualified operators who already know company procedures and preferences. As a solution, ITS made an arrangement with a not-for-profit organization which helps socially endangered, marginal youngsters. ITS offered to recruit and train a group of these people on its own expense. As these people do not feel the urge to climb the organizational ladder, they proved to be a very motivated, highly-reliable, low-turnover workforce -while at the same time a high-impact, socially desirable side-benefit was achieved.
ITS provides a good illustration of partner-induced outbound globalization. ITS services
McDonald´s cash-registers in its 120 outlets in Argentina. Clearly, maintaining this equipment operational is mission-critical for the assembly-like service chain McDonald´s outlets are. When McDonald´s approached ITS to request support for its 6 outlets in neighbourghing Paraguay, ITS quickly saw the the opportunity to gain international coverage through the partnership. ITS de Paraguay was launched as a wholly-owned subsidiary and used its operational base to quickly capture business with Unilever and Shell, two clients already being served in the home country. An advanced education center was also launched in Paraguay, and quickly put local, lower-skilled competitors in big trouble.
Being IT an increasingly globalized environment, international expansion is a must for ITS; it will open subsidiaries in Perú and Ecuador by 1998, and hopes to cover Latin America by the year 2000. RT sold 700 units in the first year of operations. In 1997, it sold 370,000 units. By the end of that year, it was selling 90,000 units monthly. Through RT, Nokia got a 42% share in the domestic market, with Motorola in a second place with a 35% share. In 1997, RT became the third largest telecom equipment supplier in the country, third in place after Siemens and Ericsson.
RT clearly spells out its mission as searching, acquiring, importing, servicing and financing new technologies' acquisition for TOs. RT searches for the worldwide best technologies and suppliers in consumer electronics, preferring in general to deal with industry second-tier players; these are much easier and faster to deal with than larger, more bureaucratic companies. RT is keenly aware of new trends in consumer saliences; for instance, although historically the key reason for buying a cellular was mobility, customer concerns are now shifting to family safety issues; there is a fast growth of cellular services specifically targeted to the parents of kids, teens and youngsters; ITS is then surveying PCS technologies, which are particularly well-suited suited to those needs. Due to the country extension, RT is also surveying rural telecom technologies, supposed to be the next growth market in the country.
RT has a well-tuned importing and distribution cycle which allows for carrying very little stock of end products. In servicing, RT claims to provide the best maintenance service to cellular units owners in the country. With a team of 30 technicians, RT claims to have a mean repairing time of 24 hours, just a 6% of the time featured by their next largest competitor.
Financing also proved to be a value innovation area for customers. Argentina has a strong cellular penetration potential; Sweden commands a 28% penetration rate, the U.S. a 16% rate, and Argentina 4%
only. One key to increase sales volume is to reduce prices for final users. RT management realized that the units cost on average $ 300, half the full cost of activating a new customer of a cellular service. To increase business turnover, RT had to make easier for COs to finance their purchases; since RT was a service firm with a very modest equity in its balance sheet, it could not secure massive import financing to be translated to the COs. In response, RT spun off RT Financing, a subsidiary company which designed a commercial paper backed up by promissory notes issued by the COs; the instrument provided bridge financing for the COs acquiring Nokia units. Since COs are reliable debtors for they belong to blue chip parent companies, the innovative, three-year term RT bond is traded in international markets and allowed COs to finance their international purchases at the lowest interest rates of the market (8%). This securitization process was a success and pumped up sales turnover of operators, which now practically give away the units for free, increasing cellulars penetration and RT sales in particular.
In contrast with ITS, RT provides a good example of market-induced outbound globalization. In 1995, Brazil started opening the telecom industry to private participation in satellite and cellular communications; being the largest telecom equipment market in Latin America ($ 8 billions as of 1997), it became a prime target for RT expansion. RT first entry attempt was, however, a failure; the firm lost $1 million in the trial; the reason was it had no local partner to help in dealing with the nuances of the local market. Despite this lesson -or better, because of it-RT has now secured a Brazilian partner. Within a framework of increasing economic openness, RT will enter Brazil for the second time in early 1998.
Although the ITS and RT stories may suggest that ASVs flourish mainly in high-tech-related businesses, the next vignette clearly shows this is not necessarily the case. investor (a former BankBoston CEO) they raised $ 2 million to start Office Net, a catalog office supplier.
Office Net carries an average of 10,000 items in stock which may be selected through both Internet and a prime-quality printed catalog. Orders are received via PC, fax or phone and are filled out in 24 hours.
Using the list of 19,000 points of sales daily served by the water-dispenser business, the new venture The fast growth of the company may be attributed to its innovative approach which quickly differentiated it in an industry characterized by unimaginative competitors and large fragmentation (in the U.S., there are 7 large and some 3,000 small office suppliers; in Argentina, there were 15,000 small suppliers and not a single large company).
A truly value-adding, customer-oriented blueprint was developed. First, the company designed a unique high-quality catalog (250 page-long, glossy paper, colorful, with 800 high resolution photographs for quick product identification, and detailed data on formats, country of origin, unit price, discounts and estimated savings) unheard of in the office-supplies sector. The company claims to offer up to 40% on average savings in the procurement of non-strategic office items through its centralized buying power; the claim is substantiated product by product in the catalog. Second, a sophisticated on-line order taking phone system was installed (also allowing for placing orders through fax and Internet); several dozens of trained operators were assigned as account officers and started establishing friendly, loyalty relationships with customers. Standard problem solving procedures were developed and enforced throughout the system. Third, free delivery was enforced and guaranteed within a 24 hour window. Finally, a call center for service level monitoring was fully implemented, closing the loop of customer care and also looking for additional business.
Innovation in offerings was also sought. Defining itself as an encompassing solution provider in office supplies, Office Net started developing special product/service offerings for corporate customers; as an example, they teamed up with a coffee-maker manufacturer and a traditional ground coffee producer to develop a special pouch, guaranteeing fresh coffee dispensing at any time in the office environment. They slowly added other higher value lines like office equipment (fax machines, photocopiers, calculators and even personal computers), and plan to soon launch their own line of supplies under the Office Net brand, very much resembling the private brand strategies of large supermarkets. However, management closely monitors all diversifying efforts to ensure focus maintenance on original core competencies: the service business. Physical distribution, for instance, is outsourced to a third party through an exclusivity arrangement in vehicles identified with the Office Net logo, hence showing a seamless image--from catalog to physical delivery-to the customer.
Technology proved also to be a key enabler of differentiation. A custom-designed software application and on-line order-taking hardware allowed for providing detailed advice to customers on product usage and on deciding on different product alternatives; and also for automatically checking the credit status of the account. Customized service was also made possible; a single corporation may appear in Office Net customer database as more than 60 different accounts, each for a different geographical location (in the city or within a corporate building). Thorough analysis of the transaction database permits identification of geographic areas at a micro level according to 'transactional density', allowing for more efficient scheduling and dispatch blueprints.
Personnel training was also an utmost concern. Each line operator went through a 2 month intensive operational training program, on transacting with customers, products information and problem solving. Both Office Net partners, in turn, travel twice a year to the U.S. and to Europe to carry out a detailed operational benchmark (stock intensity, fill rate, delivery times) with similar companies in advanced economies.
The Office Net case shows that corporate outsourcing is not restricted to high value-added products or services; low-tech, low value, frequently bought corporate items may also represent a substantial business opportunity for creative entrepreneurs.
ADVANCED SERVICE VENTURES: KEY CHARACTERISTICS
Outsourcing is clearly not a new phenomenon in Argentina or any other country, for that matter.
What is new is the extent and importance of outsourced functions. In emerging economies, it is a pervasive restructuring tactic in both incoming and established corporations; outsourcing provides a fertile ground for seeding advanced, highly-skilled providers: the advanced service ventures (ASVs).
Generally speaking, Argentine traditional SMEs can be characterized as sluggish, business-tocustomer, asset-intensive, market induced, domestically-and product-oriented companies. Advanced service ventures, on the other hand, seem to bear opposite features, being growth, business-to-business, human-intensive, outsourcing-induced, internationally-oriented service companies. The word 'advanced' means that, within the service sector, these ventures use a conspicuous set of managerial technologies which differentiate them from competitors. Each of such features is discussed next.
A Clear Vision of Core Capabilities/Controlled Diversification
Core skills -the theory of the business-are nurtured and talked about widely within ASVs; they become overarching principles for guiding behavior in an ever-changing environment, and for conceptualizing one's own standing in the competitive arena. Office Net, for instance, provides the benefits of centralized procurement (lower price), easy electronic ordering, only one contact point and invoice (this is possible since being non-strategic expenses, corporations have no need to request multiple vendor quotations), and unmatched customer service: neither internal corporate procurement areas nor competitors can meet Office Net's strict 24-hour time window.
ASVs permanently survey shifts in technology and demand. They explore all possible business opportunities, partners and technologies. For example, ITS is investing in its Internet Consulting Group and in the exploration of virtual learning environments for distance corporate education; these sectors are deemed as the next future growth areas of the company. However, expansion is restricted to core areas, extensively outsourcing non-core functions, as ITS does in accounting and payroll functions, and Office Net in physical distribution. This network-based business model exacts specific skills from actors; they must be proficient at interface and boundary-spanning roles management. Coordination (Quinn et al., 1990: 67) , negotiation, bargaining and contracting abilities become crucial success factors. Taming Bureaucracies
Since they have to work through business-to-business transactions, ASVs must know how to deal with the intricacies of corporate customers. They are familiar with the organizational mindframe, jargon, standards and needs of bureaucracies. For example, besides being able to interact with cellular operators, RT had to confront the complexities of transacting with an international (and at the beginning rather skeptical) partner as Nokia; RT is now the eight largest Nokia dealer in the world, commanding the worldwide smallest transfer price per unit, even it is under a non-exclusivity contractual arrangement.
Another example of conforming the nuances of bureaucracies is provided by Office Net: it physically breaks up orders to be able to deliver small packages to geographically-dispersed offices of the same corporate. In the three cases studied, CEOs had previous experience in dealing with large corporations, and were able to transfer such knowledge to their companies´cadres; ASVs seem to be built by entrepreneurs with a lot of corporate savvy.
Technology-enabled
All ASVs use information and telecommunications microchip-based technologies to do business in a an environment where the economics of information are responsible of value creation. All the reported companies abundantly -but selectively-use IT to interact within their networks. ITS intensively use IT both to operate inwards and outwards in support, consulting and education; RT uses IT to track on-line the status of each repair request; and Office Net service blueprint pivots around the order-taking system, whose speed and content richness means a true competitive advantage.
Human Resources Focus
Quinn (1992) has suggested that the new 'intelligent' corporations leverage intellect rather than facilities: they invest in superior selection, training, acculturation and motivation systems. Likewise, our three ASVs heavily invest in human capital since, by their very nature, information-based businesses need much internal training to enable employees in customer-contact techniques and in the application of standard operating procedures. In all three cases studied, the development of human resources was an area of explicit, operational concern for top management.
Regional/International Expansion
In large companies, technological improvements in communications and transportation allow manufacturers to expand business to much wider geographic ranges (Quinn, 1992, p.230) . In the same fashion, the entrepreneurial ventures originated as a result of MNCs' outsourcing processes frequently experience exponential growth curves and, quite soon, their success momentum in their original markets pushes them to expand regionally and internationally. In the traditional market-induced globalization, the ventures' management teams spot similar outsourcing trends in other less-developed, starting-to-emerge economies and try to replicate earlier success in them: that was the case with RT.
The literature on international business has already reported that service suppliers may follow their customers in international expansion, as has been the case in the advertising, banking and insurance sectors (Li & Guisinguer, 1992) . This behavior has also been reported in manufacturing, as in the case of the Japanese ancillary automobile industry moving to the U.S. following the entry of large Japanese automakers in that market (Banerji & Sambharya, 1996) . What is remarkable in the present research is, however, that it is a domestic, host-country service supplier (rather than a home-country supplier) which is tempted to jump abroad by corporations already established in other countries. This behavior has been reported in earlier decades in Argentina, where local suppliers were enticed by large international customers to serve them on a regional basis through internationalization 4 . This is what we call domestic, partnerinduced globalization, as the ITS case reports. When MNCs breed cheaper, capable outsourcees in one country of the globe, they seem to foster the internationalization of such partners to ripe the same benefits across countries; regional and hopefully global partnering with outsourcees becomes then MNCs' ultimate standardizing, cost-reduction strategy.
The ITS and RT cases suggest that ASVs are customer or market-induced to replicate their success in other emerging economies whose status mirrors that of the home country(Stage VII in Fig.1 ). In contrast, this attitude has been largely uncommon in the typical small Argentine business, for whom even simple exporting has usually been a quandary.
Finally, Office Net has started its regional expansion process, moving their service coverage to the greater Buenos Aires Area (inhabited by approximately 10 million people and the home of most manufacturing plants in the country). The interior of the country will follow suite in late 1998. International expansion is also a target for the management team but, wisely, the company wants to solidify current operations before being tempted to cross international borders.
IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This paper has suggested that:
a. Globalization of an emerging, transitioning economy follows a specific path: macroeconomic change, foreign investment entry, radical transformation of companies acquired by foreign competitors, and dramatic change of established companies which need to mirror the productivity improvements of newcomers;
b. Like in developed economies, downsizing and outsourcing are most important restructuring strategies; both restrict career opportunities in large corporations but at the same time generate sizable opportunities to start up small service ventures which thrive as dynamic outsourcees of their larger partners;
c. The characteristics of such ventures seem to coalesce in the form of a specific archetype (Miller & Friesen, 1978) or configuration (Mintzberg, 1979) , made up of 6 variables: a clear concept of the firm, bidirectional innovation, customer management, technology enablement, human resources focus, and regional/international expansion.
d. The cross-case analysis performed suggests these features are so stable as to suggest we may be witnessing the dawn of a new organizational type: the advanced service venture (ASV). These advanced ventures seem to be different, both in size (as compared to larger international outsourcees) and in managerial technology (as compared to traditional small outsourcees).
e. ASVs are important, first, because so much value-creation is being transferred to them by large, shrinking corporations and, as such, they represent a sizable breeder of wealth and employment; second, because they may act as replicating agents of globalization in other economies; as such, they may perform as powerful change agents in the economic development of other transitioning economies.
It may be interesting to extend the case research methodology I have used to other emerging economies, like Chile and Brazil. Chile entered the economic opening 10 years before Argentina, and Brazil, some 8 years after. Analyzing ASVs in these economies may provide more information on their development and also address the following question: what will the fate of ASVs be? In time, organizational isomorphism may push them to mimic their larger, more bureaucratic partners. Since the drive for efficiency may be strong enough to supersede the entrepreneurial spirit, aren't they prone to the risk of bureaucratizing themselves? Probably not, since business has changed its logic and MNCs are much less bureaucratic themselves; though the longitudinal scrutiny of ASVs in other economies in different stages of development may provide clues in this sense.
